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OCKHAM’S RAZOR, PROBABILITY AND QUANTUM PHYSICS AS
LOGIC
ELIAHU LEVY
Abstract. This is a philosophy-intense physics article, or, if you wish, a physics-intense
philosophy article. Also, being a mathematician, I tend to view the physics, in particular
the essence of quantum physics, in emphasizing the mathematical structure that serves as
its language. However, I do express views on typically philosophical/epistemological matters
(see, in particular, Section 1). Since these points of view do not seem to me too widely
expressed in the literature, while I find them quite compelling, I think this note has some
interest.
1. Ockham’s Razor
Let us focus on what is sometimes referred to as “inductive logic”, i.e., the “logic” of
knowledge, be it part of some lofty and sophisticated science, or be it an instance of the
myriad manifestations of everyday knowledge. For instance, knowing that there is a table in
the next room (which I do not see just now); or that our university is located in a specific
town; or that it makes sense to speak of a scale of Time, described mathematically as a real
line or part of it, which includes my present, past and future (totally different things from the
point of view of my present consciousness); or putting other people and myself on the same
footing (again, definitely not so in my “naive” present consciousness) and so on.
It seems to me that the whole “logic” or “logical process” giving this knowledge is the
principle usually referred to as Ockham’s Razor. That is, a system of assertions and concepts
is known, with more or less certainty, given some “evidence”, if this system is the simplest,
most harmonious, the least containing “unnecessary complications” of all systems that fit the
evidence, the more outstanding this system is with respect to this property, the more certain
it is. (Of course, that does not mean that the thus known system is, itself, simple.)
The results of Ockham’s Razor, thus understood, have both the flavor of “new knowledge”,
as in the examples in the first paragraph, but also the flavor of “a description chosen to
be the most economical”. Indeed, without it we would “drown” in possible (needlessly)
complicated “pictures” which all fit the evidence. For example, without such “Ockham’s
Razor” we “do not know” that, say, all distances in the world do not really change in time
in some wild manner, which we do not perceive because the measuring yardsticks change
proportionally along with the measured distances. But do not mistake, we do not thus gain
just “convenient bookkeeping” - we gain, as in the examples in the first paragraph, what
(”inductive”) knowledge is. There is no other “reality”. (All reality being known with,
possibly very high, but not absolute, certainty.)
By the way, this “inductive reasoning” - Ockham’s Razor – works not only with respect to
the “physical world”. One can and does apply it to abstract “universes of discourse” such as
numbers. For example, engineers would be totally confident in using a numerical method to
solve partial differential equations that came with a good rationale and had been tested on an
adequate set of examples, even when no proved mathematical theorem is at hand. It is just,
outstandingly, “the simplest, most harmonious, least containing unnecessary complications,
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assertion” that says that the method works. Of course, as always, that is known with some
high, but not absolute, certainty.
Note that the word “harmonious” is better not omitted here. Thus, asserting Newton’s law
for the force of gravity with the exponent 2 for the distance in the denominator has a different
status than with some exponent very near to 2. If the evidence would not force us not to do
so, Ockham’s Razor will make us assert the exponent 2 rather than some exponent very near
to it – the gain in doing this may be said to lie no less in harmony than in simplicity.
And I stress that this same “process” of knowledge “works” both in everyday knowledge
and in “professional” science (and, in a surprisingly similar way to many episodes of scientific
discovery, in the work of real and imaginary “Sherlock Holmses”). Science has no special
method peculiar to it. Any gaining of knowledge done with supreme care (in the application
of the above “logic”, i.e. Ockham’s Razor) deserves and is usually given the name of science.
2. Probability
What should we make of probability (here not referring to the mathematical discipline with
its characteristic language, but to its role in the sciences, in knowledge)?
Some say that probability is a system of assertions of facts about the world – say, about
properties of frequencies of the different results in repeated “experiments” – a branch of science
on a par with, say, electrostatics.
I claim that the calculus of probability does not sustain that view, as the following example
suggests:
Example: Toss a balanced coin independently 100 times. The calculus of probability sug-
gests that we will not observe a hundred times “heads”. Rather, the frequency of “heads”
will not deviate from 1/2 more than a few standard deviations. Indeed, the probability for a
hundred times “heads” is about 10−30.
But repeat this tossing independently 1040 times (which is not entirely impossible physically,
say in computer simulations). Then the calculus of probability predicts that in about 1010 of
the tosses we will have a hundred “heads”.
So if probability is just some assertion of facts, it would assert simultaneously that a hundred
“heads” must not occur and that it must occur!
For me, probability is an actor on the stage of gaining knowledge; in fact, it is an instance
of Ockham’s Razor.
Let us take an example: suppose I look from my balcony at some person passing in the
street. Should I expect/assert that (s)he had been to the South Pole? If I assume that of the
many identities of persons that may pass in the street below my balcony only a very small
fraction had been to the South Pole, and that these identities can be considered all equivalent
(i.e. “of the same weight”) for the consideration at hand, then it would be an “unnatural”,
“unharmonious”, “involving an unnecessary complication” assumption to say that the person
I saw has “spitefully” fallen into the tiny fraction that had been to the South Pole!
• So, what probability tells us about the “real” world is that if we endow the space of
possibilities (the sample space) with a probability measure that gives equal probability
to possibilities equivalent (by our considerations) then we can assert/expect/know that
an event (in the sense of probability) with very small probability will not occur. (As
always, know with very high, but not absolute, certainty – as “inductive” knowledge
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• Here, we are not just counting possibilities (putting this differently, we cannot take
any probability measure for the sample space of possibilities), as a famous example
shows: it is not the case that one should not expect a random student in a library to
use an English book because English is just one of 6000 existing languages!
• Similarly, the above conclusion that I should expect that the person I saw from my
balcony had not been to the South Pole would not hold if I knew that there is now a
parade of South Pole explorers!
• Thus, the choice of the probability measure (the decision which possibilities are “equiv-
alent”) is governed by our “ambient” knowledge/science (where we again use Ockham’s
Razor).
• The particular result of the 100 independent coin-tosses in the example above also
had a probability of about 10−30. But it occurred. Still, for a tossing in the future,
or otherwise where we do not know the result, we should expect that this particular
result shall not occur (i.e. that one of the other 1030 results will occur). Here is an
instance of changing our scientific theories when new evidence makes us do so.
A fact (say, the result of the above tossing) should be called accidental when we have
no means to predict it in advance. (And a remark in passim: laws of nature are just
known facts with some high symmetry (in space, time, etc.) or generality. Except for
this symmetry/generality, they have the same status as any other knowledge. Their
symmetry/generality, in itself, does not make them more “necessary”, meaning less
“accidental”, than more particular facts.)
• To quote a famous example: suppose that a, supposedly random, picking of letters re-
sulted in the word “CONSTANTINOPLE”. We should weigh all our evidence to decide
whether the probability measure we took was correct, and an unexpected (”acciden-
tal”) result has occurred, or we were wrong in our assessment about which possibilities
were equivalent, and indeed the result should have been expected.
• Also, what probability says about the relative frequency of occurrence of results in
repeated (independent) experiments, is that we should expect/assert/know that fre-
quency not to deviate from the probability of the result in a single experiment more
than, say, a few standard deviations, since the event of it doing so has a tiny probability.
(Again, as always, that knowledge is with high, not absolute, certainty.)1
• We can reason as follows about (independently) repeated experiments, say the gender
of a born baby (male or female): assume we conceive a finite set B of all past and
future=all possible births, and let 100p be the percentage of male among them. Sup-
pose also that the observed births are viewed as a subset of n elements taken from B,
and that all subsets of n elements of B may be considered scientifically equivalent. The
set E consisting of all subsets of n elements with percentage of male births more than
a few standard deviations different from 100p is a tiny fraction of the set of all subsets
of n elements of B, therefore we may expect/assert/know that the percentage in our
observed set does not differ too much from 100p. Hence, we may take the observed
percentage to be a suitable approximation to 100p.
1Defining probability as the limit of the frequency in an infinite sequence of repeated experiments (that
deemed a legitimate mathematical abstraction), as sometimes proposed, does not seem to do the trick. First,
that will hold only if we restrict the set of admissible infinite sequences (forbidding some set with probability
zero) – without that any limit (or divergence) may occur – thus one here bases the definition of probability on
the notion of sets of probability zero. Second, this, anyway, will not change the situation noted above, that
the frequency in a finite sequence of experiments is only expected to have some relation (not to deviate more
than a few standard deviations) with the probability in a single experiment.
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• Suppose, as with the classical case of (scientific) induction, that all observed cases have
the designated property (here: being male). Then we may deduce that p is very close
to 1. To put it differently: it would be an “unnatural” “unharmonious” “involving
an unnecessary complication” assertion to say that there is a considerable possibility
not to have the designated property, yet “spitefully” all our observed cases avoided
this possibility. In fact, if there are no reasons not to say so, we will take as simplest
explanation that that property is a universal law. So we will expect, with high degree
of certainty, to find it also with the untested, say future, cases.
Note, however, that here we are working under the assumption that the tested and
untested cases can be, to begin with, considered as “of the same kind”/equivalent.
The induction assesses this assumption along with “inferring from the tested to the
untested”. Indeed, if we begin with dissimilarity (as with Nelson Goodman’s famous
example of “bleen” defined to be blue until today and green from tomorrow onward)
the inductive inference evaporates.
• One may thus answer the accusation that in applying probability to the “real world”
we are drawing conclusions about the “real world” from analytic/purely mathematical
statements. The non-analytical ingredient is the requirement that the probability
measure in the sample space shall give equal probability to scientifically equivalent
possibilities.
• In the treatment of the notion of probabilistic independence, the keen student might
observe a missing ingredient. Independence is usually presented as a definition, at first
sight somewhat “arbitrary”, while on the other hand assuming/“postulating” it, or
something like it, is crucial for the presence of any “real world” probability-theoretical
conclusions in almost all cases.
The missing ingredient is that scientific/physics independence does imply probabilis-
tic independence. If two partitions of the sample space of possibilities are scientifically
independent, say pertain to two physical systems with negligible interactions, and if the
elements of each partition are “scientifically equivalent”, then so will be the elements
of the partition consisting of the intersections of elements of one partition with the
elements of the other. Thus in this case a product measure (in other words, assuming
independence) is appropriate.
• So we have found that only events with probability very close to 0 or very close to 1
have any direct connection with the non-probabilistic “world”: the former are known,
with high certainty (i.e. as knowledge can be had), not to occur while the latter are
known with high certainty to occur. We could, for that purpose, replace the probability
measure we took in the sample space with, say, a measure obtained by integrating a
function bounded between 1/2 and 2. However, to begin with we had to take a measure
that gives equal weight to “scientifically equivalent” events, say, a measure invariant
under the symmetries of the physics. In many cases this invariance fixes the measure
once we know which events have small probability (recall the ergodic theorems). Also,
invariant measures support the connection between the frequency of a result in repeated
experiments and the probability of that result in a single experiment.
But saying that an event has probability 0.7, say, has no direct connection with the
non-probabilistic world. In the actual world, the event either happens or not – only in
the case where the probability is very close to 1 or 0 we know, as knowledge can be
had, that it will happen/will not happen. Still, saying that the probability is 0.7 has
a scientific meaning, derived from the “scientifically” correct probability measure on
the sample space of possibilities.
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So, in conclusion, our vista shows an instance of Ockham’s Razor – the assertion that events
with tiny probability will not occur – obtaining a quantitative/mathematical flavor. Also, to
have it we must choose a probability measure in the sample space which gives equal weight
to scientifically equivalent events, say is invariant under the symmetries of the physics.
3. Systems of Possibilities (in Classical Physics)
It is one of the cornerstones of the way one speaks of physics to view the actual world
as one “state” or “possible world” in a system of possibilities. Thus there are the laws of
planetary motion under gravity, which allow many possible scenarios, one of which is the
actual case. In such a “system of possibilities”, we cannot say that logical statements are
“true” or “false”. Rather, they are true in some possible worlds and false in others. The
logical statements (”events” in the parlance of probability theory) form a Boolean algebra, in
general bigger than just the pair 2 = {“true”, “false”}. Two statements/events correspond to
the same member of the Boolean algebra if they are equivalent in the system of possibilities,
i.e. hold or do not hold simultaneously for any state/possible world.
Mathematically, we can start with the Boolean algebra, and define the states/possible
worlds as Boolean homomorphisms from the Boolean algebra of events to the two-element
Boolean algebra 2 = {“true”, “false”} – a possible world is characterized by which of the
statements in the Boolean algebra hold in it. A third way will be to start with the com-
plex ∗-algebra of all bounded complex numerical magnitudes (having, in general, different
numerical values in different possible worlds), with the operations of addition, multiplication,
multiplication by a complex number and (complex) conjugation. Then the “logical state-
ments”/events will emerge as projections, i.e. magnitudes p with the properties p2 = p and
p∗ = p. The states/possible worlds will be the ∗-homomorphisms (in other words, self-adjoint
multiplicative linear functionals) from the algebra of bounded magnitudes to the complex
numbers (mapping each magnitude to its value at that state).
For Time and Space we adopt a kind of (classical!) “Heisenberg picture”. The “logical
statements”/events and magnitudes may refer, in some manner, to a time-point, or to several
time-points, and with “naive”, i.e. non-general-relativistic Time, there will be the group of
time-shifts acting on the logical statements, on the magnitudes, on the states/possible worlds
etc., which transform each state a, i.e. each ”possible world”, to a state “with the same
relations to tomorrow as a is to today”. Similarly for magnitudes etc. (And analogously
there will be space-shifts by space vectors; thus the Space-Time picture of Special Relativity
is readily implemented.)
We may have determinism for states, i.e. in our system of possibilities the “state of today
determines the state of tomorrow and of all times” (That is a “Schro¨dinger picture”. In our
“Heisenberg picture” we should just say that the time-shifts are uniquely defined). But the
occurance of an event (in the terminology of probability), i.e. a set of states, equivalently a
“logical statement”, will, in general, not determine the events in other times (say the future).
But if we have a probability measure (from the point of view of the algebra of bounded
magnitudes – a positive linear functional giving to 1 the value 1) we can make statements
about the probability of such future events given the present event.
4. A Digression: Events of Probability 0 in the Infinitary Mathematical
Treatment of Probability.
It is often essential, in science, to use what may be called “infinitary” mathematics even if
all we “see” is a “mundane” finite system. For probability this is done by having a sample
space which is a measure space of total measure 1 with the events the σ-algebra of measurable
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sets. In the case of an uncountable such “probability space”, such as the interval [0, 1] with
Lebesgue measure, nonempty sets E of measure 0 are inevitable. Inasmuch as the points in
the space are indeed considered as possible outcomes, such events E are “possible”, but in
fact one does not hesitate to throw away or add such a 0-probability event to the sample space
if needed.
Thus in the famous Norbert Wiener’s sample space for Brownian Motion, one knows that
for almost all sample points (i.e. for all except a set of measure 0) the path of the motion is
continuous, so one willingly takes as sample space only continuous paths.
An even more striking example: in quantum mechanics, the wave-function of a particle as
function of position determines the probabilities of the particle being in subsets of position
space, while its Fourier transform – the wave function of momentum – does so for subsets
of momentum space. But the Fourier transform for L2 functions, such as are general wave-
functions, is determined only up to a change in a set of measure 0. Thus from the start one
does not care about what happens in sets of measure 0.
In this sense, a better description would be the measure algebra or the (commutative)
von Neumann algebra L∞ of the sample space. Also there there is no restriction of countability
for unions etc. – the measure Boolean algebra is complete. The countability restriction in
the usual uncountable sample space thus appears as an artifact of that way of representing
the measure algebra/von Neumann algebra, and the very status of the points of the sample
space as true sample points is cast in doubt – genuine sample points should be self-adjoint
normal (i.e. preserving infinite monotone limits) multiplicative functionals – states – on the
von Neumann algebra, which are lacking in the non-discrete case.
From this discussion one may conclude that is it fundamentally impossible to conceive
physically an infinite set of “occurrences” “experiments”, because then any particular possible
sequence of results, including the sequence occurring in the actual world, has, in general,
probability 0 and thus can be excluded from the sample space!
5. Quantum Physics as Logic
The advent of quantum physics came when experiments forced us to replace the commuta-
tive ∗-algebra of the bounded magnitudes, as a way to define the system of possibilities, with
a non-commutative ∗-algebra (the algebra of the (complexified) bounded observables). This
acts, above all, as a “strange” logic (for the system of possibilities). This logic cannot be
defined, as in the commutative/classical case, by operations among the events/logical state-
ments themselves (these being again the projections, i.e. members p of the algebra satisfying
p2 = p and p∗ = p). Indeed, Boolean operations among events=projections are defined only if
they are compatible, i.e. if they commute.2 The logic is rather given by the non-commutative
∗-algebra itself, whose operations are always defined. (Thus there is no harm if for defining
the logic we take the algebra of bounded observables, while observables in general need not be
bounded.) To decipher what this logic says we must proceed, as much as possible, by analogy
with “usual” (i.e. commutative algebra) logic.
Note, that this is just the logic that science teaches us to put in the system of possibilities.
It is not a rival to the usual logic of, say, mathematics. Indeed, in treating that system
mathematically we are with ordinary mathematical logic.
2One may be tempted to extend the definition of union and intersection to non-compatible events as the
sum and intersection of the relevant subspaces of the Hilbert space. Note, however, that these operations
depend highly non-continuousely on the subspaces, which seems to positively disqualify them.
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In the commutative case probability measures were positive linear functionals3 on the al-
gebra mapping 1 to 1. By analogy, here also we view positive linear functionals mapping 1
to 1 as “probability measures”. Such a probability measure gives to each event a probability
0 ≤ p ≤ 1, which for disjoint compatible events (for whom a union is defined) will be ad-
ditive. Of course, when the non-commutative algebra is written as an algebra of operators
in a Hilbert space, these “probability measures” take the form of density matrices (positive
Hermitian operators of trace 1).
The non-commutativity of the algebra changes completely the role of states. Genuine
states, following the commutative case, should be ∗-homomorphisms from the algebra of (the
complexified) bounded observables to the complex numbers (i.e. multiplicative self-adjoint
linear functionals). There every observable will get its value and every projection=event
will get the value 1 or 0 = “true” or “false”. But for a non-commutative algebra such ∗-
homomorphisms are rare and insufficient. The “states” spoken of in quantum physics, given
by vectors in a Hilbert space up to multiplication by a scalar, are something else. These are
events characterized by being “atomic” in a mathematical sense, i.e. they have no proper sub-
events. Equivalently, there is only one “probability measure” supported in them. Physically,
they give the maximum specificity that one can have, what in the classical/commutative case
had characterized single states/possible worlds. But their unique probability measure gives to
a general event a value different from 0 or 1. In particular, future events have just probabilities
with respect to such “mathematically atomic” “states”. In this these maximum specificity
states are like general events – sets of states – in the commutative case.
Note, that in the commutative case only states/possible worlds could endow statements/events
of the system of possibilities with a truth-value ’true” or “false”, so that these events occur
or not/these statements are true or false. In the system of possibilities itself these are just
elements of a Boolean algebra, and saying that they occur or not is meaningless. The same
holds for the non-commutative quantum system of possibilities.
But, in this quantum picture, we still have to recover our “actual world” – where events
occur or not – and our usual Boolean logic. It seems clear where to find them. We need a
commutative sub-algebra, and something like that presents itself: the algebra of the macro-
scopic, quasi-classical observables which almost commute. These, and the events they define,
are what we have in our old classically behaving world. Note that the evolution of this system
in Time is defined by conjugation with imaginary exponents of the energy (Schro¨dinger’s equa-
tion), So the energy, itself quasi-classical, cannot exactly commute with other quasi-classical
observables, otherwise there would be no time evolution there. Similarly with the momentum
which induces variation in space. Thus this quasi-classical sub-algebra is approximately com-
mutative, (in fact, even its members are only approximate – they cannot be handled in greater
precision than the “uncertainty” that makes them commute) and our “actual world” is de-
scribed by an approximate *-homomorphism from this algebra to the complex numbers, which
will give values 0 or 1 to projections (events) belonging to this “quasi-classical” algebra, i.e.
truth values “true” or “false” to these “quasi-classical” statements. Only these events occur or
not in our “actual” world, and only with them we can use our usual logic. Their approximate
nature is usually unnoticed by us, since we ourselves come from this “approximate world”,
but it limits the number of different events (statements) that we can meaningfully conjunct or
disjunct, thus limits the number of things – amount of information – that we can speak about
(to something like a “mundane” action measured in Planck’s Constant – something like 1034),
limits the amount of time to the past or future that can have meaning for our “actual world”
3In fact, to be mathematically correct, in the infinite-dimensional case, only positive linear functionals
belonging to the predual (of the von Neumann algebra) and mapping 1 to 1 are to be taken as probability
measures. The same in the non-commutative case.
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(because the non-commutativity with observables transformed by Hamiltonian evolution, al-
though small and negligible for our mundane intervals of Time, becomes big for “enormous”
intervals, hence one cannot include presumably “quasi-classical” quantities pertaining to enor-
mously distant times or distances – something like multiples of mundane times or distances by
the ratio of a mundane action to Planck’s constant – in the same approximate commutative
algebra), all that making our physical “actual world” finite to a delimited extent. The infinite
space or time models used in physics serve, in this respect, a similar role to the infinite plane
of coordinates in which a map includes the grounds of a city.
And a great origin of “paradoxes” in thinking about Quantum Theory is our reluctance
to obey its “strange” logic, where it is meaningful for events to happen or not only when
speaking about the “actual world”, that “extra ingredient” described by an approximate ∗-
homomorphism from the approximately commutative algebra of the quasi-classical observables
to the complex numbers, while without that extra ingredient we have the Theory with its non-
commutative logic, dealing only with the “system of possibilities”, where it is meaningless for
events to occur or not. But this Theory does speak about particles, fields, physical systems
etc. and one is so tempted to say, in its frame, that “the electron is here or there” “it has
this or that property” “the system is (or was) in that state” as if events there happened or
not, which the “non-commutative logic” of the “system of possibilities” forbids. And then one
runs straight into paradoxes.
Note that it seems that we really have here an “extra ingredient”. One might wonder
whether we could not deduce everything in our “actual world” from “probability close to 1”
arguments. This seems not to be the case. It seems that in many cases quantum fluctuations
have been magnified to macroscopic consequences, making many different outcomes each with
small probability, of which just one is asserted in the actual world. And moreover there are
so many details in our “actual world” that seem entirely erratic.
Of course, we can investigate non-quasi-classical systems only by making them bear on our
almost-commutative quasi-classical “world”, i.e. by measuring them. Moreover, our “world”
is protected from “stray non-commutativity”, such as carrying conclusions of former measure-
ments to the future via the Hamiltonian (Schro¨dinger’s equation) evolution, by decoherence,
which will wipe out any such conclusions, preserve only what is quasi-classical and (almost)
commuting and thus create the separating wall between the quasi-classical and the truly quan-
tum worlds. Any “Schro¨dinger cat” (or “Schro¨dinger physicist or mathematician”, for that
matter) is either in the quasi-classical domain, hence one may assume in principle that in our
“actual world” the question: is (s)he alive? is settled, or is in the truly quantum domain,
where superpositions are routine, but can then be investigated by us only via measurements.
Usually, the quasi-classical world is governed by the deterministic laws of classical physics, to
be derived, in principle, from the quantum theory. But the fact that everything is approximate
has consequences. Thus when the deterministic classical equations are chaotic we have true
non-determinism in the quasi-classical system: between assertions about far enough time-
moments one may have only probabilistic relations. Another case of non-determinism comes
from measurements and measurements-like phenomena, where “truly quantum” elements bear
on the quasi-classical “world”.
When we proceed to apply Ockham’s Razor, in its particular “probabilistic” flavor, to
such quantum systems, we have to follow the “non-commutative” guidelines. We will have a
“probability measure”, dictated by the science and its symmetries, in the non-commutative
system of possibilities, i.e. a positive linear functional on the non-commutative algebra of
(complexified) bounded observables giving to 1 the value 1 (= a density matrix). Its restriction
to the approximately-commutative quasi-classical algebra will give an ordinary (approximate)
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probability measure on the quasi-classical (approximate) events, and if some (quasi-classical)
event has tiny conditional probability relative to the (quasi-classical) things that we already
know to be true in the “actual world”, then we assert/know (with high certainty) that it will
not occur (in our actual world). Indeed, if it had exactly zero conditional probability, then
the theory would say that its negation includes = follows from what we already know. Here,
since the event has tiny conditional probability, we should not assume that our actual world
has “spitefully” fallen into it.
(Note that here we work in the general framework of quantum physics, the “acceptance”
of which, of course, is also a result of “inductive logic” = Ockham’s Razor, which “produces”
all our (”inductive”, known with high certainty) knowledge. That we must, in principle, be
prepared to “amend” if forced to do so by further future evidence.)
Let us consider the proverbial quantum measurement. A quantum system is prepared, by
making a measurement and taking only the cases with suitable outcomes (say, “electrons that
move in a certain way”), Then, maybe after some “development” in the quantum system,
another measurement is made, then, maybe, more measurements. We, of course, “live” in the
quasi-classical world, where in our “actual world” the measuring apparatuses recorded results
of the measurements. Here, contrary to a quantum “non-commutative system of possibilities”,
assertions are true or false – it is true that the measurements gave these results. Note that
the total Hilbert space must have room for keeping records of all these measurement results.
In particular, it must keep a record that the system had been appropriately prepared (by a
measurement and selecting the desirable cases).
We assume that each measurement distinguished between all vectors in a basis of the Hilbert
space of the quantum system to be measured (there is no “classical randomness”).
The computations of what should be expected in this experiment would follow, of course, the
usual rules of Copenhagen Quantum Theory. This is because mathematically, each subsequent
measurement, by adding to the quasi-classical record, basically makes our entire Hilbert space
tensor with the Hilbert space of the new (quasi-classical) record. In writing the “probability
distribution” – density matrix – that we should take, always in a basis that diagonalizes the
quasi-classical observables, each entry wij of the density matrix will be replaced, by the above
tensoring, with a sub-matrix with trace wij, (a positive Hermitian sub-matrix in the case of
a diagonal element wii), and conditioning to the quasi-classical event of the specific result of
the new measurement (true in the actual world) picks a particular entry in the diagonal of
that sub-matrix. For the next measurement this entry itself is to be expanded into a sub-
matrix, etc. Note the remarkable fact that every subsequent measurement as if “imposes” its
pure state as the new density matrix after the conditioning – we can “forget” what density
matrix we used before. In other words, we must compute as if each measurement had induced
a collapse of the state of the measured quantum system (which has nothing to do with the
group of time-shifts – Hamiltonian evolution – which of course, always acts by Schro¨dinger’s
equation).
So what does Ockham’s Razor tell us here?
To speak loosely, the result of every measurement has singled out a pure state τ which
supports only one “probability distribution” – density matrix, i.e. τ ∗ ⊗ τ . Hence we know
“which probability distribution to take”. And we find that for independent repetitions of the
experiments, the quasi-classical event that indicates that the correct frequency of a property
= measurement result (in the correct margin of error) will occur, is “almost” implied by =
contains the future of the event stating that we prepared the experiments correctly – “almost”
– in the sense of the probability distribution dictated by the “pure states” of the measurement
results, which is, indeed, the probability measure that we should take. Hence we must expect
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that this event will occur (in our actual world) – our actual world will not “spitefully” fall into
the “negligible by weight” negation of that event – while we do not have such “probability
close to 0 or 1” situation for the result of each particular experiment, so there we do not
“know”. That is, of course, the usual scenario, also in classical physics, with probabilistic,
non deterministic cases.
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